Yesterday I related the evidence and the defence statements. After my closing statement, the Judge took a recess of about half an hour before returning to court and delivering this judgement. I tried to scribble it out verbatim, but I may have missed a few minor passages. However the substance of the judgement is here.
Judgement (By District Judge Turner)
The background to this trial is this: A year ago, a movement called ‘Extinction Rebellion’ began. It soon became the largest movement of civil disobedience my lifetime; growing exponentially. It sought a method to get the Government to decisively de-carbonise and to mitigate the effects of climate change. At the movements core is a belief that conventional protest does not work, and that more extreme steps that cannot be ignored by Government must be employed. If enough people signed up to the tactics then the Government would be forced to act. The four defendants before me today knew that, and signed up for it.
The demonstrations in April took the form of occupying key parts of London with a view to causing disruption. These demonstrations were peaceful and carnival-like. There was no suggestion of violence. But they were intended to have disruptive consequences.
Good Character. People of good character are more likely to tell the truth and less likely to commit a crime. There is no suggestion that any of these four are not of good character.
The offence charged is a breach of section 14 of the public order act 1986.
If the senior police officer on the scene has the reasonable belief that serious disruption to the life of the community is occurring, he may impose conditions on the assembly.
Subsection 5 of section 14 of the public order act defines the offence. Did CI Galvin reasonably believe that serious disruption was happening? At the time of the notice the protests were well under way and the disruption was severe to both transport and to business. Cressida Dick later referred to the Police’s ability to respond to other crimes being adversely affected. CI Galvin informed himself of the situation before making his judgement, therefore the section 14 notice was justified.
But there are still other matters to consider. The right to protest is enshrined under European Human Rights legislation, and post the human rights act, the law carries more weight. However I am going to refer to the cases of Zeigler and James, which cover the relevant issues. In Zeigler, where articles 10 & 11 are in place, the direction must be necessary, proportionate and proscribed by law.
1) Is interference in pursuit of a legitimate aim?
2) Is the aim sufficiently important?
3) Is there a rational aim to achieve?
4) Is there a less restrictive way?
5) Is there a balance with the rights of others?
CI Galvin wanted the static protest in parliament square to end and to move to Marble Arch. The police action to enforce the notice was delayed to see how the situation might develop. Meanwhile, the disruption continued, and it was justified to apply enforcement of the notice.
Was the protest justified? Yes it was. Was there a rational connection? Yes there was. Were there less restrictive means available to the police? No there weren’t (Note – we disputed this, and the judge did not elaborate).
I am entirely satisfied that CI Galvin was justified in imposing the section 14 notice.
The three male defendants accept that they knew about the section 14 notice but chose not to comply. They argued the case of necessity. Necessity is one of the few common law defences to justify breaking the law. However, it has limits, and they cannot put their views above the law. Once necessity is in place, the Crown must disprove it. It is clear that the scientific opinions are sound. Mr Lloyd’s argument of the ‘aggregate effect’ of people in the protest is novel, and may need to be examined by a higher court. I am not going to examine that here, but to park it.
The case of Archbold defines the boundaries of this defence. An act which would otherwise be an offence can be justified. An act which would otherwise be an offence can be justified if it saves a greater harm. But only if:
· No more was done than was necessary.
· That the evil ensuing does not override the evil of the original act.
· The threat and harm needs to be near but (as per the Iraq hijack case) the more remote the threat and harm, the harder it is to justify.
Industry and Governments are contributing to climate change in ways that are avoidable. The defence argue that by XR taking direct action, Parliament is more likely to pass acts to decarbonise. Other Governments may then follow our example and this will prevent harm and benefit will accrue.
But was it necessary to perform a criminal act?
The defence need to demonstrate that our acts in Parliament Square were preventing a greater evil. I say that the defence falls way short of this.
In the case of Charlotte, the defence needs to be knowing non-compliance. She cannot rely on wilful ignorance. I am certain that she knew of the section 14 notice and she knew what the Police were doing. She did need a reasonable time to comply (note – she was given 3 seconds!), but I am sure that she knew what was happening.
Guilty in all four cases.
The prosecution asked for £720 in costs for all defendants, but the Judge thought this was excessive. He gave us all a 9 month conditional discharge plus £400 contribution to prosecution costs plus the statutory £15 victim surcharge.
The judge expressed that he was grateful that the hearing was held in such a respectful manner, and that he regretted having to convict four people of such good character who had obviously acted according to their consciences and had researched the issues thoroughly. However he had to convict according to the law.
I have to say that the judgement was pretty much as I expected based upon previous judgements in earlier XR cases. We had tried to concentrate on demonstrating the imminence of the threat, and the direct connection between our actions in Parliament Square and the subsequent positive actions by Parliament (the declaration of the climate emergency and the legal commitment to a net zero carbon emissions by 2050). After the Judge directed us to the cases of Zeigler and Archbold, we also tried to argue that the weight of the balance of rights between our right to protest and the public's right to go about their business undisrupted must be heavier on our side due to the magnitude of the threat facing humanity. However, we obviously failed.
My next post will examine the cases of Zeigler and Archbold, that District Judge Turner considered to be so vital to his judgement.
I have to say that I have absolutely no regrets about my actions in April, despite my conviction. It is a small price to pay, and the positive actions taken by Parliament following April, and the raised awareness of the public, make it all worthwhile. It was worth it.